In this paper, we compare firm-specific attributes including outside director remuneration for two groups of firms. One of these groups consists of 96 firms that did not give stock options to the CEO during the sample period 1992-01, while the other group of 571 firms granted stock options on a consistent basis during these years. Our results indicate that for the group with stock option grants, the remuneration to outside directors was significantly higher and the CEO had longer tenure compared to the other group. These results are robust even after controlling for other economic attributes associated with the decision to grant stock options.
Introduction
The expectations and pay climb for outside directors have attracted much publicity in recent times. A recent New York Times article state that " [S] candals, lawsuits, government scrutiny-these are dark days for corporate board members. But that doesn't mean directors aren't paid well. In fact, they are compensating themselves even better as a result", (Oneal, New York Times, April 6, 2003) . Consequent to the perception of increased outside director pay, it is important to examine what causes outside directors to monitor managers, rather than to collude with them. As Fama and Jensen (1983) point out, market for outside director services and reputational concerns may dampen their incentive to collude. However, they also argue that the signals are credible only when direct payments to outside directors are small. In this paper, we investigate the possible link between the decision to grant stock options to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the remuneration to outside directors of the firm.
Board monitoring is an important corporate control mechanism by which managers are disciplined to act in the investor's interest (Bushman and Smith, 2001) .
Managers subject to lax monitoring might be able to impose greater agency costs on the firm, which, in turn, may lead to excessive executive compensation (Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard, 2002; and Core, Holthuausen and Larker, 1999) . Outside directors as members of the board as well as members of the compensation committee 1 have a direct impact in determining CEO compensation. However, for CEO pay to be optimal for 1 A compensation committee typically is composed of three or four directors. In most firms, all or almost all of the directors serving on the committee are outside directors (Bebchuk et al., 2002 While a predominant number of publicly-traded firms grant stock options to the CEO, there still are quite a few firms that do not grant stock options. This permits a comparison of firm-specific attributes between these two groups. We investigate the association between the decision to award stock option pay to the CEO and a range of outside director compensation components such as the fixed annual retainer, meeting fees, stock or stock options granted for each outside director, and additional stock or stock options granted to qualifying outside directors. 2 In addition, we investigate whether the influence of the CEO on the board impacts the decision to grant stock option to the CEO. We compare these attributes for two groups of firms, one comprising 96 firms that did not give stock options to the CEO during the sample period 1992-01, and the other 571 firms that gave stock options on a consistent basis during these years.
Our principal findings, employing univariate comparisons and multiple logit analysis, are as follows. The decision to grant stock pay is positively related to most components of outside director remuneration and CEO influence captured by the length of tenure. These findings are potentially important in the public policy arena, since establishing the link between outside director compensation and CEO stock option pay is one key building block in the understanding of the likelihood of rent extracting behavior by CEOs. This is especially important after Sarbanes-Oxley act, which was enacted to strengthen corporate governance of publicly traded firms.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 presents the prior literature and the research expectations. Section 3 describes the research design and sample selection. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Research Expectations
The most pronounced trend in executive compensation has been the explosion in stock option grants, which on a Black-Scholes valuation basis now constitutes the single largest component of managerial pay (Murphy, 1999) . One explanation for the increase in stock option pay is rooted in the institutional acceptance of stock options as an incentive pay and the value of stock options being exacerbated by the prolonged bull market for the period 1992-2000. The behavioral explanation for the stock option trend is an increased acceptance of stock options by executives caused by nearly two decades of sustained bull markets. Therefore, during prolonged market upturns, it is not surprising that companies systematically scale back their accounting based performance plans in favor of seemingly more lucrative option programs.
Yermack (1995, 1997) analyzes the determinants of option grants and concludes that cross-sectional patterns in grants are not well explained by agency or financial contracting theory. One possible reason explaining the lack of a strong link between CEO pay and firm performance is the violation of the underlying assumption of arm's length relationship between the manager and the board of directors used in contracting theory.
The departure from an arm's length relationship implies that governance structures are weak and CEOs' exert undue influence in the determination of their own pay.
The director pay practices have come under increased scrutiny by both regulators and investors. It is important to have good remuneration packages to hold and attract high-quality directors who are expected to work harder and assume more risk in the new regulatory environment. However, when shareholders and lawmakers complain that boards of directors were too lax in overseeing company performance and too compliant in approving pay packages for executive, their incentives are called into question.
3 Social dynamics within the board could also play a role in determining whether a CEO gets stock option pay. Outside directors receiving a high pay may tend to reciprocate by granting higher pay to CEOs. This is especially true if the outside directors were appointed to the board by the same CEO. Further, in most cases, the incremental compensation cost incurred by a company with less than vigilant outside directors is unlikely to reduce the stock price sufficiently to spark a hostile takeover attempt and threaten the outside directors' position (Bebchuk et al., 2002) . Building on the above arguments, our first research expectation can be stated as:
Expectation 1: The decision to grant stock option pay to CEOs is positively related to outside director remuneration.
CEO's control over board nominations process and board dynamics militate against effective compensation oversight by the outside directors (Bebchuk et al., 2002) .
When a CEO is also the chair of the board he or she will have a higher control over the outside directors (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999) . This is also true if the CEO has long tenure. If CEOs wield high level of influence over the board, then in effect they are setting their own pay levels. Our second research expectation follows :
Expectation 2: The decision to grant stock option pay to CEOs is positively related to CEO's influence over the board of directors.
Data Selection
We construct our sample as a subset of the firms on the 1992-2001 ExecuComp database.
This dataset contains 14,013 firm-year observations from 2,072 companies. From this total, we exclude financial institutions and agricultural companies. We also require companies to have at least three years of data, which further reduces the sample size.
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Financial variables are obtained from COMPUSTAT and returns data from CRSP. These procedures yield a sample of 9,061 firm-year observations for 1,688 firms (Please see Table 1 ). Of these 1,688 firms, 96 did not grant stock options to the CEO during any of the sample years, 1,021 firms gave stock options on a sporadic basis, and 571 firms granted stock options on a consistent basis. We carry out the analysis using only two groups: 406 firm-year observations (96 firms) with no stock options and 2,902 firm-year observations (571 firms) granting stock options on a consistent basis during 1992-2001.
The industry representation of our sample is given in Table 2 .
Results
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis and univariate comparisons are presented in Table 3 . The last column of Table 3 presents the results of a test of mean differences between the two groups. We examine six components of outside directors' compensation: the annual cash retainer paid to each director, the total fees paid to a director for attending all board meetings, the number of options each outside director received, the number of shares of stock received by each outside director, the maximum number of additional options granted to qualifying outside directors and the maximum number of additional shares of stock granted to qualifying outside directors. Except for the maximum number of additional options to outside directors, all the remaining five variables are significantly larger for the group of firms granting stock options on a consistent basis.
We include two proxies to capture the CEO's influence, CEO tenure and whether the CEO is also the chair of the board. The results indicate a longer tenure or more incidence of the CEO being the chair of the board for the group granting stock options.
We also include control variables that may explain the cross-sectional differences in the decision to award stock option pay to CEO. The choice of these variables is consistent with prior literature on CEO pay (e.g., Core, Holthuausen and Larker, 1999; Bryan, Hwang and Lilien, 2000; Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002 ). An analysis of past performance (prior year ROA and stock returns) indicates that the group without stock options had higher prior ROA. Other variables relate to financial cost, growth opportunities (book to market ratio), complexity of operations (change in sales) the riskiness of the firm (standard deviation of common stock returns over the prior five years), leverage, size and whether the firm is included in the S&P 500 index. The group granting stock options are larger in size, exhibit more variability of prior stock returns and have higher growth opportunities. Table 4 presents the results of multiple logit analysis. The dependent variable is set equal to one if the firm awards stock option on a consistent basis in our sample period.
The independent variables include six measures of outside director pay, two attributes of the influence of the CEO and nine control variables. The results are consistent with our expectations. Outside directors receive significantly higher compensation and the CEO has longer tenure for the group of firms with stock options.
We perform several sensitivity analyses. First, the results hold when we delete extreme observations. We also conducted the analysis after scaling the annual retainer for directors and annual meeting fees by sales. The results and inferences are similar.
Further, we conducted two other comparisons, one between firms granting stock options sporadically with firms with consistent stock option grants, and the other between firms with no stock options with firms with sporadic stock options. The inferences are similar.
Conclusion
We compare outside director remuneration and CEO influence for two groups of firms.
The first of these groups never gave stock options to the CEO during the sample period, while the second group granted stock options in a consistent basis. Our results indicate that the for the group with stock options, remuneration to outside directors were higher and the CEO had longer tenure compared to the group with no stock options. These results are robust even after controlling for other economic attributes of the firm argued to be associated with the decision to grant stock options.
These findings are potentially important in the public policy arena, since establishing the link between outside director compensation and CEO stock option pay is one key building block in the understanding of the likelihood of rent extracting behavior by CEOs. This is especially important after Sarbanes-Oxley act, which was enacted to strengthen corporate governance of publicly traded firms. Our results are consistent with an inference of potential conflict of interest for these outside directors. This adds to the growing body of empirical documentation raising questions about the effectiveness of monitoring managers by the board of directors and may accelerate external forces attempting to promulgate and enforce more effective corporate governance. ANN_DIR_RET it :annual cash retainer paid to each director of firm i in year t (in thousand of dollars); MEET_FEES it : total fees paid to a director for attending all board meetings of firm i in year t (in thousand of dollars); DIR_OPTIONS it : the number of options each outside director received of firm i in year t (in thousand of units); DIR_STOCK it : the number of shares of stock received by each outside director of firm i in year t (in thousand of units); ADD_DIR_OPT it :the maximum number of additional options granted to qualifying outside directors of firm i in year t (in thousand of units); ADD_DIR_STK it :the maximum number of additional shares of stock granted to qualifying outside directors of firm i in year t (in thousand of units); TENURE it : number of years worked credited for retirement for the CEO of firm i in year t; CEOCHAIR it :a dummy variable equals to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board of directors of firm i in year t; RETURN_1 it-1 : previous year total return to shareholders, including the monthly reinvestment of dividends of firm i in year t-1; ROA it-1 : the return on assets of firm i on year t-1; FINANCIAL COST it : an indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in operating income before depreciation for firm i in year t is positive and is 0 otherwise; VARIABILITY it-1 standard deviation of firm i''s stock return for the period of 60 months prior to year t; CHG_SALE it-1: change in the annual sales of firm i between period t-2 and t-1; GROWTH it-1 : ratio of the beginning book value of equity of firm i over the beginning market value of equity; LEVERAGE it-1 : financial leverage (liabilities over common stock equity) of firm i at the beginning of period t; and SIZE it-1 : the natural logarithm of the assets at the beginning of the year of firm i.
TABLE 4 Multiple Logit Analysis
Logistic regression estimates the probability that a company grants stock options to the CEO. The dependent variable is set to one if the firm awards stock option on a consistent basis in our sample period (Group 2 versus Group 1).
Group 2 versus Group 1

Sign Coefficient
Chi SP500 is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm is part of the S&P500 index and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 3. *** significantly different from 0 at 1% level; ** significantly different from 0 at 5% level; and * significantly different from 0 at 10% level.
